













empirical	one	 (whether	philosophers	of	 religion	are	 influenced	by	 irrelevant	 factors	 in	





Philosophers	 value	 rational	 belief-formation,	 in	 particular,	 if	 it	 concerns	 their	
philosophical	 views.	 Authors	 such	 as	 Descartes	 (1641	 [1992])	 and	 al-Ghazālī	 (1100	
[1952])	 thought	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 cast	 off	 the	 preconceptions	 they	 grew	 up	 with.	




he	 started	 questioning	 the	 beliefs	 he	 acquired	 through	 his	 parents	 the	 moment	 he	
realized	their	pervasive	influence	in	how	religious	views	are	formed:		





Al-Ghazālī	 and	 Descartes	 assumed	 that	 mere	 reflective	 awareness	 of	 the	 role	 of	
irrelevant	 influences	 in	 one’s	 religious	 beliefs	 is	 enough	 to	 counteract	 their	 distorting	
influence.	 Yet	 there	 is	 an	 increasing	 recognition	 that	 philosophical	 viewpoints	 and	
arguments	 are	 embedded	 within	 a	 broader	 cognitive	 and	 socio-cultural	 context,	 and	
that	one	cannot	simply	cast	off	the	beliefs	one	has	acquired	as	a	result	of	this	context.		
This	has	become	especially	 clear	with	 the	development	of	experimental	philosophy,	 a	
philosophical	method	that	aims	to	shed	light	on	philosophical	intuitions	and	background	
assumptions	 using	 empirical	 means.	 One	 branch	 of	 experimental	 philosophy	 has	
focused	on	intuitions	(the	so-called	“intuitional	program”,	Sytsma	and	Livengood	2016).	
The	 intuitional	 program	 has	 uncovered	 substantial	 variations	 in	 intuitions	 about	
knowledge,	 beliefs,	 moral	 responsibility,	 and	 free	 will,	 depending	 on	 factors	 such	 as	




example,	Schwitzgebel	and	Cushman’s	 (2012,	2015)	experiments	on	 framing	effects	 in	
trolley	scenarios	demonstrate	 that	philosophers	are	not	 immune	to	contextual	 factors	
when	 they	make	philosophical	 judgments.	 In	 these	experiments,	philosophy	PhDs	and	
MAs,	 non-philosophy	 PhDs	 and	 MAs,	 and	 people	 without	 PhD	 or	 MA	 degree,	 were	
presented	with	a	series	of	trolley	scenarios	involving	a	personal	harming	action	(pushing	
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a	 man	 off	 a	 footbridge	 to	 stop	 a	 train	 that	 would	 otherwise	 kill	 five	 people)	 and	
scenarios	involving	no	personal	contact	(flipping	a	switch	to	divert	a	trolley	from	a	track	




way	 is	 morally	 better,	 worse,	 or	 the	 same	 as	 harming	 someone	 at	 a	 distance	 (the	
personal	 principle).	 Philosophers	 were	 less	 likely	 to	 endorse	 the	 doctrine	 of	 double	
effect	and	the	personal	principle	if	the	push	scenario	was	presented	prior	to	the	switch	
scenario.	They	did	 so	even	when	 they	were	encouraged	 to	 reflect	on	 this	 task,	and	 in	
spite	of	the	fact	that	the	doctrine	of	double	effect	can	hardly	have	been	new	to	them.			
There	is	thus	increasing	evidence	that	philosophers	are	subject	to	non-rational	factors	in	
their	 work.	 Several	 authors	 have	 argued	 that	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 is	 particularly	
vulnerable	to	the	pernicious	influence	of	factors	such	as	personal	beliefs	and	upbringing,	




philosophers	 of	 religion	 weren’t	 already	 convinced	 that	 God	 exists,	 they	 would	 not	
accept	 or	 formulate	 the	 rather	 slipshod	 solutions	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 evil.	 The	 worry	
these	authors	have	 is	 that	philosophy	of	religion	 is	a	thinly	veiled	form	of	apologetics,	
where	the	conclusions	philosophers	draw	are	already	accepted	in	advance.		
A	 related	 concern	 is	 that	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 may	 be	 intellectually	 impoverished,	
reflecting	 the	 beliefs	 of	 its	 practitioners	 (primarily,	 Christian	 theists	 and	 a	minority	 of	
scientific	naturalists),	 rather	 than	a	much	 richer	palette	of	 religious	views	 that	 remain	
unanalyzed.	Most	analytic	philosophers	work	in	an	environment	where	Christian	theism	
and	 scientific	 naturalism	 are	 the	 two	 main	 metaphysical	 views	 on	 offer,	 which	 may	
explain	why	these	are	the	only	ones	that	have	been	subject	to	systematic	philosophical	
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scrutiny.	 Alternative	 positions	 such	 as	 pantheism,	 deism,	 or	 ietsism	 are	 rarely	
mentioned	 (Schellenberg	2015),	 let	 alone	 thick	 theological	 views	 as	 can	be	 found,	 for	






of	philosophers	of	 religion.	 For	example,	philosophy	of	 religion	has	disproportionately	
many	 theists	 compared	 to	 other	 philosophical	 disciplines	 (see	 e.g.,	 Bourget	 and	
Chalmers	2014,	see	also	subsection	4.2	for	how	the	present	survey	compares	to	these	
findings).	 Philosophers	 of	 religion	 are	 influenced	 by	 their	 religious	 beliefs	 in	 their	
evaluation	 of	 religious	 arguments,	with	 theists	 reacting	more	 positively	 to	 arguments	
that	 are	 in	 favor	 of	 God’s	 existence	 (Tobia	 2016)	 and	 atheists	 evaluating	 arguments	
against	the	existence	of	God	more	positively	(De	Cruz	and	De	Smedt	2016).		
These	 findings	 indicate	 a	 correlation	 between	 irrelevant	 influences	 and	 philosophical	
views,	but	do	not	as	such	demonstrate	causation.	Qualitative	data	that	directly	look	at	
the	 role	 of	 contextual	 factors	 in	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 can	 shed	 light	 on	 how	 factors	
such	as	upbringing,	personal	experience,	and	emotional	attachment	shape	philosophical	
views.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 can	 help	 us	 to	 tackle	 a	 broader	 normative	 question,	 which	 has	
received	attention	in	the	recent	epistemological	literature:	is	the	role	of	such	factors	in	
shaping	 philosophical	 views	 rationally	 permissive?	 This	 paper	 presents	 a	 qualitative	
survey	with	philosophers	of	religion	to	help	answer	two	questions:		
Empirical	 question	 To	 what	 extent	 are	 philosophers	 of	 religion	 influenced	 by	 non-





The	paper	 is	structured	as	follows.	 In	section	2	 I	examine	how	irrelevant	factors	might	
shape	views	 in	 the	philosophy	of	 religion.	Section	3	discusses	 the	methodology	of	 the	
qualitative	 survey;	 section	4	provides	 a	detailed	analysis	 of	 its	 findings.	 In	 section	5,	 I	
assess	concerns	that	philosophers	of	religion	might	be	influenced	by	personal	religious	
beliefs	 and	 upbringing.	 I	 argue	 that	 some	 of	 these	worries	 are	 exaggerated,	 but	 that	
others	present	a	serious	epistemic	challenge.	I	address	the	broader	question	of	whether	




Epistemologists	 debate	 to	 what	 extent	 evidence	 should	 determine	 what	 we	 could	
rationally	believe.	Typically,	when	a	subject	S	believes	that	p	she	does	so	on	the	basis	of	















to	 the	 permissivism/uniqueness	 debate	 in	 epistemology.	 According	 to	 proponents	 of	
uniqueness,	a	total	body	of	evidence	permits	only	one	rational	doxastic	attitude:	 for	a	
given	proposition	p,	 “there	 is	 just	one	 rationally	permissible	doxastic	attitude	one	can	
take,	 given	 a	 particular	 body	 of	 evidence”	 (White	 2014,	 312).	 Uniqueness	 is	 a	 strong	
thesis;	 it	 is	 stronger	 than	 evidentialism,	which	 says	 that	 S	 is	 justified	 (not	 necessarily	
required)	to	take	a	doxastic	attitude	to	p	 iff	taking	that	attitude	is	epistemically	fitting,	
given	her	total	evidence	(Ballantyne	and	Coffman	2012).	White	(2014)	has	argued	that	
cases	 where	 IFs	 play	 a	 large	 role	 in	 belief	 formation	 are	 akin	 to	 ingesting	 a	 pill	 that	
randomly	 leads	 to	a	belief	 that	p	 nor	not-p,	 or	 swallowing	a	pill	 that	would	 randomly	
lower	 your	 credence	 that	 p	 to	 .1	 or	 increase	 it	 to	 .7.	 The	 randomness	 of	 such	 pill-
popping	cases,	White	 thinks,	 is	not	dissimilar	 to	accidental	 factors	outside	of	our	own	
control,	such	as	the	religious	background	of	our	parents.			
By	contrast,	permissivists	(e.g.,	Schoenfield	2014,	Vavova	2018)	argue	that	there	is	some	
latitude	 when	 we	 form	 our	 beliefs	 and	 credences.	 In	 some	 cases,	 we	 can	 rationally	
respond	 to	a	given	body	of	evidence	 in	more	 than	one	way,	coming	 from	a	variety	of	
starting	 points,	 and	 perhaps	 also	 use	 different	 epistemic	 principles	 to	 arrive	 at	 our	
reasoning.	Proponents	of	permissivism	offer	both	intuitive	and	formal	considerations	for	
their	position.	Intuitively,	it	seems	obvious	that	there	are	many	instances	where	people	
rationally	 disagree,	 such	 as	 scientists	 coming	 to	 divergent	 conclusions	 based	 on	 their	
differing	 evaluations	 of	 sources	 of	 evidence.	 To	 dismiss	 such	 disagreements	 as	
unreasonable,	or	 to	deem	the	scientists’	 conclusions	 irrational	because	of	background	
factors	beyond	their	control,	seems	 implausible.	Formally,	many	theories	of	rationality	
(e.g.,	 coherentism,	 subjective	 Bayesianism)	 require	 that	 permissivism	 is	 true	
(Schoenfield	2014).		




one	has	been	subject	to	 IFs	when	forming	the	belief	 that	p	 is	a	proper	cause	to	 lower	
one’s	confidence	in	the	credence	that	p.	For	example,	suppose	a	voter	was	targeted	by	a	
tailored	political	 campaign	 (based	on	her	 FaceBook	 likes,	 posts,	 and	private	messages	
suggesting	 she	 is	 anxious	 and	 xenophobic)	 with	 fake	 news	 suggesting	 that	 Muslim	
immigrants	 are	 swamping	 the	 country.	 After	 days	 of	 seeing	 such	 misleading	 news	
articles	and	ads,	 the	voter	 comes	 to	 the	belief	 that	 this	 is	 indeed	 the	case.	When	she	
finds	out	that	she	was	the	target	of	a	tailored	campaign,	it	seems	commendable	for	her	
to	doubt	her	belief	that	Muslim	immigrants	are	swamping	the	country,	and	she	would	
probably	 do	 well	 to	 double-check	 the	 news	 sites	 and	 other	 alleged	 sources	 of	
information	 she	 saw.	While	 there	 are	 a	 few	 claims	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 higher-order	
evidence	 is	 irrelevant	 when	 evaluating	 first-order	 evidence	 (e.g.,	 Kelly	 2005),	 most	




rational	 attitudes	has	been	 tricky.	 If	 IFs	were	 like	White’s	 (2014)	pill-popping	 cases,	 it	
would	 be	 difficult	 to	 maintain	 our	 beliefs	 formed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 IFs	 in	 the	 face	 of	
knowledge	about	 their	origins.	For	one	thing,	a	pill-induced	belief	 (if	 such	a	belief	can	
exist)	is	highly	isolated,	because	ingesting	the	pill	is	a	single	event	quite	distinct	from	our	
other	actions.	By	contrast,	religious	and	political	beliefs	are	the	result	of	a	rich	tapestry	
of	 IFs	 such	 as	 the	 religious	 beliefs	 of	 one’s	 parents	 and	 friends.	 Moreover,	 they	 are	
closely	 connected	 to	 other	 beliefs.	 Some	 authors	 (e.g.,	 Simpson	 2017,	 Vavova	 2018)	
have	 attempted	 to	 outline	 general	 principles	 that	might	 help	 us	 distinguish	 situations	
where	permissivism	is	plausible	from	situations	where	we	should	be	genuinely	worried	
about	 the	 role	of	 IFs	 in	our	belief	 formation.	Simpson	 (2017),	 for	 instance,	 thinks	 that	
one	can	be	a	permissivist	about	a	given	question	Q	if	the	agents	involved	disagree	about	
Q	because	 they	have	different	cognitive	abilities	and	apply	different	 standards.	 In	 this	
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To	address	 the	empirical	 question,	 I	 have	used	an	open,	 anonymized	 survey	 that	was	






1	There	 is	 disagreement	 about	 what	 would	 constitute	 a	 moderate	 degree	 of	 permissivism.	
According	 to	 White	 (2014),	 strong	 permissivism	 means	 that	 different	 people	 could,	 in	 some	
cases,	believe	p	or	not-p	based	on	the	same	body	of	evidence,	whereas	moderate	permissivism	
means	 that	 they	can	have	different	degrees	of	 confidence	 that	p	 is	 true.	Horowitz	 (2014)	and	
Kelly	 (2014)	 see	 moderate	 permissivism	 as	 the	 view	 that	 rational	 responses	 can	 be	 situated	
within	a	certain	range.	Other	forms	of	moderate	permissivism	(e.g.,	Vavova,	2018)	focus	on	the	
sources	of	 IFs	 rather	 than	how	people	 respond	 in	 the	 face	of	 IFs	 and	evidence.	 I	will	 adopt	 a	
source-permissivist	position	in	section	5.		
2	A	 detailed	 examination	 of	 the	 role	 of	 qualitative	 research	 in	 philosophy	 lies	 outside	 of	 the	
scope	 of	 this	 paper.	 For	 a	 thorough	 overview	 of	 the	 prospects	 of	 qualitative	 studies	 in	
































As	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 this	 survey,	 I	 explicitly	 ask	 participants	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 irrelevant	
influences	that	have	shaped	their	philosophical	thinking.	Thus,	the	survey	relies	on	self-
report,	 which	 has	 limitations	 that	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 psychological	
literature.	The	most	prominent	of	these	are:		
(1)	 Inability	 to	 identify	 some	 of	 the	 IFs:	 given	 that	 experimental	 philosophers	 are	
uncovering	IFs	that	philosophers	were	previously	unaware	of,	which	play	a	role	in	their	
evaluation	 of	 philosophical	 scenarios	 (e.g.,	 ordering	 effects,	 framing	 effects,	 cultural	
differences	in	intuitions),	it	is	likely	that	my	participants	did	not	identify	all	the	IFs	that	
might	possibly	impact	their	work.	
(2)	 Socially	 desirable	 responding:	 this	 is	 the	 tendency	 of	 participants	 to	 present	 a	
favorable	 image	 of	 themselves.	 It	 may	 distort	 the	 results	 of	 both	 qualitative	 and	
quantitative	studies,	on	a	variety	of	subjects	such	as	charitable	donation,	dietary	habits,	
and	exercising	(van	de	Mortel	2008).	Likewise,	even	though	this	survey	was	anonymous,	







De	 Smedt	 2016)	 have	 attempted	 to	 reveal	 unconscious	 bias	 in	 the	 evaluation	 of	
philosophical	 arguments	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 God.	 While	 such	 studies	 are	 better	 at	
avoiding	 social	 desirability	 responding	 and	 can	 also	 potentially	 uncover	 biases	 that	
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participants	are	not	consciously	aware	of,	they	are	typically	narrower	in	the	kinds	of	IFs	






is	 qualitative,	 the	 results	 will	 not	 in	 detail	 explore	 inferential	 statistics	 or	 possible	
significant	 correlations	 (with	 a	 few	motivated	 exceptions,	 as	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 next	
section).	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 true	 range	of	 IFs	 is	 likely	even	wider,	 and	 the	
extent	to	which	they	operate	probably	more	pervasive.	These	limitations	of	the	survey,	
as	well	as	its	exploratory	character,	need	to	be	kept	in	mind	when	evaluating	the	results.		
Participants	 were	 invited	 through	 a	 philosophy	mailing	 list	 (Philos-L)	 and	widely	 read	
philosophy	 blogs	 (Prosblogion—now	 continued—and	 Feminist	 Philosophers).	 The	
invitation	 clearly	 stated	 that	 the	 survey	 was	 exclusively	 aimed	 at	 professional	
philosophers	 of	 religion	 (the	multiple-choice	 survey	question	on	how	many	 years	 had	
elapsed	post-PhD	was	used	 to	exclude	people	who	are	not	professional	 philosophers.	
Graduate	students	were	included,	but	people	who	were	neither	graduate	students	nor	


















As	philosophy	of	 religion	 is	a	 relatively	small	 field,	 insiders	might	be	able	 to	guess	 the	
identity	of	some	respondents.	To	reduce	this	risk	of	identification,	I	report	at	most	one	






150	philosophers	of	 religion	participated	 in	 the	 survey.	134	participants	 completed	all	
questions	(that	is,	all	questions	from	1	to	8,	as	question	9	was	clearly	marked	optional),	
5	respondents	completed	all	but	one	or	two	of	the	questions,	and	11	answered	only	a	
few	 questions.	 My	 analysis	 includes	 the	 surveys	 that	 were	 completed	 or	 nearly	
completed	(with	nearly	completed	I	mean	that	one	or	two	of	the	open	questions	were	
not	 answered;	 this	 does	 not	 include	 the	 optional	 question	 9),	 N	 =	 139.	 83%	 of	 the	
respondents	 were	 male;	 the	 remaining	 17%	 were	 female	 (no	 respondent	 indicated	
another	 gender).	 This	 sample	 is	 thus	 more	 skewed	 toward	 men	 than	 the	 gender	









Respondents	 were	 working	 in	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 institutions,	 for	 example,	 faith-based	
small	 liberal	 arts	 colleges	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 large	 research-oriented	 universities	 in	
Germany,	 research-intensive	 institutions	 (Russell	 Group)	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 and	
two-year	teaching-focused	community	colleges	 in	the	United	States.	For	question	1	(Is	
the	 school	 faith-based?),	 30%	 of	 respondents	 reported	 working	 in	 faith-based	
institutions.	Some	of	these	colleges	were	mainly	faith	schools	in	name,	e.g.,	“[my	school	




Responses	 to	 question	 5	 “How	would	 you	 describe	 your	 personal	 religious	 beliefs,	 or	
lack	 thereof?”	 were	 coded	 into	 the	 following	 categories:	 (1)	 Christian	 theist,	 for	
respondents	who	explicitly	identify	as	Christian	or	member	of	a	Christian	denomination,	
(2)	 Other	 theist,	 for	 anyone	 who	 explicitly	 mentions	 a	 non-Christian	 monotheistic	
religion,	 such	 as	 Judaism	 or	 Islam,	 (3)	 Other	 religious	 believer,	 e.g.,	 polytheist,	 (4)	
Unspecified	religious	believer,	 someone	who	says	 they	are	religious	but	do	not	specify	
the	 religion,	 (5)	Atheist,	 someone	who	 says	 they	are	an	atheist,	 or	 reject	 any	 form	of	
supernaturalism,	(6)	Agnostic,	(7)	It’s	complicated/other,	anyone	who	does	not	fit	in	the	
above	 categories.	 Figure	 1	 shows	 a	 summary	 of	 the	 results	 with	 the	 number	 of	



















tend	 to	 self-identify	 as	 traditional	 or	 orthodox,	 e.g.,	 “fairly	 conservative”,	 “devout,	
Orthodox,	practicing	open	Christian.”	Some	explicitly	endorsed	the	Nicene	Creed:	“I	am	
committed	 to	 the	 central	 claims	 of	 the	 Christian	 tradition,	 captured	 in	 the	 Nicene	
Creed”,	 “I	affirm	the	Apostle’s	creed	and	 the	Nicene	Creed.	Beyond	 that,	while	 I	have	
opinions,	 I	 regard	 things	 as	 pretty	 unsettled	 and	 tentative.”	Moreover,	 a	 majority	 of	
Christians	 in	 the	 sample	 identified	 with	 specific	 denominations	 or	 movements,	 for	
instance:	 “Committed	 Christian	 (Eastern	 Orthodox,	 specifically),”	 “tortured	 but	
enthusiastic	 Roman	 Catholic”,	 “I’m	 a	 relatively	 theologically	 conservative	 Evangelical	
Christian”,	 “orthodox	Anglican	 ...	 a	 traditionally	minded	Christian”,	 “I	do	not	 currently	
attend	an	Anglican	or	Episcopal	church,	but	I	still	 identify	with	the	worldwide	Anglican	
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Communion”.	 Non-Christian	 theists	 were	 decidedly	 in	 the	minority:	 only	 one	Muslim	




















































or	evangelical	atheist	 (I	 try	 to	avoid	having	the	“convert’s	zeal”);	 I	merely	
disbelieve	 in	 God’s	 existence.	 —	 male	 associate	 professor	 at	 an	
international	branch	campus	of	a	large,	research-oriented	US	university.		
5.8%	(N	=	8)	respondents	were	agnostic,	for	example:		
I	 am	 agnostic,	 I	 am	 afraid.	 I	 put	 this	 that	 way,	 because	 I	 think	 that	
agnosticism	is	perhaps	a	most	fair	stance	to	take	(we	do	not	know	whether	
God	exists	or	not,	and	we	are	unable	to	prove	that	he	does	or	does	not,	so	
this	 is	 the	 most	 intellectually	 fair	 option),	 but,	 altogether,	 it	 somehow	




agnosticism	 (coded	 in	 the	 categories	 3	 and	 7).	 These	 participants	 frequently	 voiced	
conflicting	beliefs	and	doubts,	for	instance:		
Struggled	to	carve	out	a	conceptual	space	for	myself	as	a	spiritual	person,	
without	having	any	 typically	 “religious”	beliefs.	 I	 believe	 in	 a	God,	 and	 in	
my	 relationship	 to	 God	 as	 the	 source	 of	 value	 and	 meaning	 in	 my	 life.	
However,	I	doubt	the	veracity	of	almost	all	tenets	of	the	Christian	tradition	










teens	 that	 convinced	me	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 some	 kind	 of	minimal	 super-	 or	







Why	 did	 respondents	 choose	 to	 specialize	 in	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 (question	 3,	 “Can	
you	tell	something	about	the	factors	that	contributed	to	your	specializing	in	philosophy	
of	 religion”)?	 To	 code	 responses,	 coders	 used	 the	 following	 categories:	 (1)	 Religious	
upbringing,	 (e.g.,	Christian	parents)	 that	kindled	 the	 respondents	 interest	 in	 the	 topic,	
(2)	 Religious	 identity	 or	 experience	 (e.g.,	 a	 personal	 connection	 or	 affiliation	 to	 a	
religious	 denomination),	 (3)	 Proselytism,	 witness,	 apologetics:	 the	 wish	 to	 propagate	
particular	 religious	 or	 areligious	 views,	 (4)	 Philosophical	 interest,	 finding	 religious	
questions	 interesting	 from	a	primarily	philosophical	perspective,	 for	 instance,	wanting	
to	 know	 whether	 theism	 is	 true,	 whether	 the	 existence	 of	 God	 can	 be	 proved,	
connection	to	other	areas	of	philosophy	such	as	metaphysics	or	ethics,	(5)	respondents	
found	 Religion	 a	 culturally,	 historically,	 or	 sociologically	 interesting	 phenomenon,	 (6)	


















philosophy	 of	 religion	 is	 a	 form	 of	 faith	 seeking	 understanding.	 When	 combining	




by	way	 of—paradoxically—putting	 the	 faith	 itself	 into	 question	 and	 even	
criticizing	it.	—	male	assistant	professor,	public	university,	Italy.	
I’m	 a	 cerebral	 religious	 person	 and	 thinking	 carefully	 about	my	 faith	 is	 a	
plus	 not	 a	 negative.	 I	 particularly	 enjoy	 working	 on	 the	 philosophical	
aspects	 of	 moral	 and	 religious	 diversity.	 Perhaps	 I	 am	 getting	 a	 better	
understanding	of	other	faiths	and	denominations	when	I	do	this.	—	female	
full	professor,	research-oriented	university,	UK.		








When	 I	 was	 a	 child	 I	 was	 a	 very	 committed	 believer	 and	 participant	 in	
Christianity.	 I	 gradually	 lost	 my	 faith,	 and	 the	 finishing	 element	 was	 a	





philosophy	 of	 religion	 intellectually	 fascinating.	 —	 female	 full	 professor,	
research-intensive	university,	country	not	disclosed.		
Many	respondents	reported	an	 interest	 in	 the	philosophical	 ideas	that	are	explored	 in	
philosophy	of	religion	(33.1%),	for	instance,	“I	wanted	to	find	out	whether	any	general	
religious	 claims	 about	 reality	 like	 “God	 exists”	 are	 true	 or	 false.”	 Some	 respondents	
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thought	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 was	 also	 a	 good	 field	 to	 specialize	 in	 for	 pragmatic	
reasons:		
I’ve	 always	 been	 interested	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 but	 have	
specialised	in	 it	for	a	number	of	reasons.	The	contemporary	debates	tend	
to	 be	 on	 broader	 (metaphysical)	 problems	 than	 those	 in	 metaphysics,	




feel	 I	 can	 engage	 with	 the	 arguments	 and	 positions	 from	 an	 objective	
position.	—	female	graduate	student,	research-intensive	university,	UK.		
Few	 of	 the	 respondents	 were	 explicitly	 motivated	 by	 proselytism,	 witness,	 or	
apologetics	(7.2%):		
My	religious	commitment	helps	to	motivate	some	of	the	work	I	do	(part	of	




doctrines,	 which	 I	 would	 publish.	 —	 male	 emeritus	 professor,	 research	
university,	UK.		
The	 respondents	 who	 gave	 this	 motivation	 (N	 =	 10)	 were	 all	 Christian	 theists,	 which	




as	 a	 motivating	 factor	 for	 engaging	 in	 their	 research	 (14.4%).	 More	 atheists	 (16%	 of	
	 21	
atheists)	 than	 theists	 (9.6%	 of	 theists)	 were	 drawn	 to	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 for	 this	
reason:		
Even	 though	 I	 do	 not	 believe	 in	 any	 religion	 or	 God(s),	 I	 do	 know	 that	
religion	 is	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 our	 culture.	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 the	
phenomenology	of	religious	belief	simply	because	it	has	been	so	important	
in	shaping	our	society,	and	in	particular	art/literature/etc.,	and	even	people	
who	 are	 not	 religious	 do	 live	 in	 a	 society	 that	 is	 importantly	 religious	 in	
many	 ways.	—	 female	 graduate	 student,	 research-intensive	 department,	
UK.		
20.1%	 of	 respondents	 mentioned	 undergraduate	 education,	 inspirational	 professors,	




despite	growing	more	and	more	secular	as	 the	years	went	by.	 I	was	 (and	
still	 am)	very	 interested	 in	medieval	philosophy,	which	 is	what	 led	me	 to	
questions	in	philosophy	of	religion.	Since	then,	I	have	spent	a	year	in	a	very	
old,	 German	 theological	 faculty,	 which	 awakened	 interest	 in	 figures	 like	
Schleiermacher	 and	Otto,	 and	my	 interests	 have	 now	 turned	 to	 religious	





















undergraduates,	 when	 encountering	 philosophical	 objections	 to	 theism.	 By	 contrast,	
9.4%	 (N	 =13)	 went	 from	 agnosticism	 or	 atheism	 to	 religious	 belief.	 Of	 the	 current	
atheists	in	the	sample	(N	=	25),	7	are	former	religious	believers,	of	the	current	agnostics	
(N	 =	 8),	 5	 are	 former	 religious	 believers.	 This	 amounts	 to	 33%	 of	 both	 atheists	 and	
agnostics	being	former	religious	believers.	By	contrast,	of	the	current	theists	(N	=	85)	in	
the	 sample,	 only	 11	 (12.9%)	 were	 former	 atheists	 and	 agnostics.	 This	 difference	 is	
statistically	significant,	Fisher’s	exact	test,	two-tailed		(N	=	118),	p	<	0.01.	Of	the	theists	
who	 converted	 to	 atheism,	 several	 stated	 that	 they	 had	 held	 unreflective	 religious	
beliefs	 before	 they	 studied	 philosophy.	 They	 subsequently	 began	 to	 question	 and	
abandon	them:		
I	 was	 a	 theist	 when	 I	 began	 university.	 It	 was	 during	 reading	 Hume’s	
Dialogues	 in	my	second	year	 that	 I	began	 the	 road	 to	atheism.	 I	believed	
that	 Hume	 successfully	 undermined	 every	 rational	 reason	 I	 had	 for	 my	
personal	belief	 in	God	...	 I	have	to	admit	that	I	 initially	felt	very	confused,	
lost,	ashamed	and	angry	when	I	realized	that	I	no	longer	could	count	myself	




For	 one	 respondent,	 his	 growing	 disenchantment	with	 arguments	 for	 theism	was	 the	
final	push	for	him	to	become	an	atheist:		
I	was	a	moderate	Christian	entering	college	...	I	recall	specifically	the	straw	
that	 broke	 the	 camel’s	 back—that	 made	 me	 finally	 admit	 that	 I	 was	 an	
atheist.	I	was	reading	the	arguments	in	a	book	called	[redacted].	The	theist	
in	 the	 debate	was	 [redacted],	 and	his	 arguments	were	 so	 bad	 and	he	 so	
obviously	willfully	ignored	the	arguments	of	his	opponent	that	I	finally	said	







least	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 lacking	 belief	 in	 God).	 I	 investigated	 many	 many	
arguments	for	and	against	the	existence	of	God.	I	discovered	that	my	initial	
impression	of	“the”	arguments	was	overly	 simplistic	 ...	 In	 the	end	 (or	 the	
next	beginning),	the	arguments	for	God	seemed	to	win	out,	and	so	I	began	
to	 lean	 toward	 belief	 in	 God.	 As	 I’ve	 progressed	 further	 in	 philosophy,	 I	
seemed	to	find	many	reasons	to	think	God	exists,	and	the	reasons	against	
God	 seemed	 less	 persuasive.	 Of	 course,	 I’m	 aware	 of	 the	 problem	 of	
polarization,	and	so	I	try	to	keep	testing	various	arguments	and	listening	to	






settled	on	a	non-naturalistic	 atheism.	—	male	 full	 professor,	 small	 liberal	
arts	college,	no	country	provided.		




Some	philosophers	noted	a	 tempering	 in	more	extreme	atheist	or	 religious	views	as	a	
result	of	their	exposure	to	philosophy;	often	this	was	the	mere	fact	of	being	exposed	to	
other	views:		
I	 was	 raised	 in	 a	 very	 conservative,	 Protestant	 evangelical	 home,	 and	 I	
attended	 a	 high	 school	 and	 a	 college	 that	 fit	 well	 into	 this	 tradition.	 In	
graduate	 school	 I	 realized	 for	 the	 first	 time	what	 it	would	be	 like	 (in	 the	
Nagelian	 sense)	 to	 have	 a	 purely	 secular	 mindset	 ...	 This	 precipitated	 a	






How	 do	 participants	 see	 the	 relationship	 between	 their	 religious	 beliefs	 and	
commitments	and	 their	philosophical	work	 (question	8:	 “How	would	you	describe	 the	
relationship	between	your	personal	 religious	beliefs,	or	 lack	thereof,	and	your	work	 in	
philosophy	of	religion”)?	The	answers	were	coded	as	(1)	Intimate	relationship,	(2)	Looser	









I	 do	 not	 think	 that	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 religion	 because	 I	 am	 an	 atheist.	
Rather,	 it	 is	 fascinating	 to	 me	 that	 anyone	 should	 be	 anything	 but	 an	
atheist.	In	addition,	I	think	it	vital	that	we	understand	the	impact	of	religion	
upon	 society,	 both	 in	 its	 positive	 and	 its	 negative	 aspects.	 —	 male	
professor,	private	secular	university,	Poland.	
For	 20	 respondents	 (14.4%),	 religious	 beliefs	 are	 the	 most	 important,	 and	 their	
philosophical	work	is	ancillary	to	it:		




A	 smaller	 group	 of	 participants,	 6.5%	 (N	 =	 9)	 has	 a	 “philosophy	 first”	 view,	 where	
philosophy	has	the	final	word:		
















lying	or	 living	 the	 sort	 of	 soul-stultifying	 existence	 that	 does	not	 become	
the	 life	 of	 the	 mind.	 What	 the	 relationship	 is	 exactly	 is	 hard	 for	 me	 to	
discern.	 At	 times,	 I	 am	 exploring	 or	 even	 just	 playing	 with	 parts	 of	 the	
conceptual	landscape	that	happen	to	have	something	to	do	with	God	or	a	
religious	worldview.	At	other	times,	I	feel	I	am	combating	noxious	poisons	
that	 threaten	 truths	of	 essential	 importance.	At	other	 times,	 I	 think	 I	 am	
trying	 to	 explain	myself	 to	myself	 or	 am	 even	 complaining	 to	 God	 in	 an	
academic	venue.	—	male	assistant	professor,	small	liberal	arts	college,	US.		
I	would	 say	 that	my	personal	 religious	beliefs	partly	*motivate*	my	work	
and	even	*influence*	it,	but	they	do	not	dictate	it.		A	recurring	motif	in	my	
philosophical	 thinking	 and	writing	 is	 rejection	 of	 (or	 at	 least	 a	 *wariness	
about*)	 naturalistic	 reductionism	 and	 methodological	 skepticism.	 	 These	
are	not	core	religious	doctrines,	of	course,	but	they	make	sense	in	the	light	
of	my	religious	commitments,	and	they	help	in	turn	to	make	sense	of	those	





Many	 respondents	 spontaneously	 offered	 criticisms	 of	 their	 discipline	 for	 question	 9	
(“Are	 there	 any	 additional	 anecdotes	 or	 personal	 observations	 that	 you	 think	 are	
relevant	for	this	study?”).	While	most	of	these	were	atheists	or	agnostics,	some	theists	
were	 also	 critical	 of	 philosophy	 of	 religion.	 Criticisms	 were	 mainly	 directed	 at	 the	
apologetic	nature	of	philosophy	of	 religion,	 its	 perceived	 lack	of	 real-world	 relevance,	
and	its	lack	of	attention	for	traditions	outside	of	Christianity.	Here	is	a	selection:		
Philosophy	 of	 religion	 is	 too	much	 focused	 on	 issues	 of	what	 is	 true	 and	
what	 is	 false,	 from	 a	 doctrinal	 standpoint,	 and	my	 latest	 thinking	 is	 that	
such	 issues	 aren’t	 primary.	—	male	 distinguished	 philosopher	 of	 religion,	
US.			
The	 ‘rigour’	and	analytical	 ‘skills’	 in	 this	branch	of	philosophy	has	kept	 its	
(Christian)	 philosophers	 isolated	 and	 distant	 from	 the	 social,	 ethical	 and	
political	 changes	 taking	 place	 in	 other	 branches	 of	 analytic	 philosophy.	
Insularity	 has	 allowed	 the	 field	 to	 protect	 and	 to	 encourage	 narrow-
mindedness	 and	 overconfidence	 in	 the	 thinking	 of	 the	 best	 known	 (and	
best	funded)	philosophers	of	religion	in	the	world.	—	female	full	professor,	
secular	university,	UK.		
I	 would	 not	 be	 the	 first	 to	 say	 that	 philosophy	 of	 religion,	 especially	
“analytic	theology,”	is	simply	not	philosophy.	It’s	Christian	apologetics,	and	
it	often	is	poorer	philosophically	because	of	that.	A	Christian	bias	pervades	
everything,	 and,	 once	 one	 becomes	 a	 non-Christian,	 the	 irrational	 faith-
based	assumptions	and	intuitions	start	to	stand	out.	Philosophy	of	religion	
is	 increasingly	 out	 of	 touch	with	 the	 actual	 practice	 of	 religion	 in	 Europe	
and	the	Americas.	It	needs	to	be	revitalized	by	making	contact	with	the	rich	
religious	pluralism	now	evolving	 in	Europe	and	the	Americas.	We	need	to	





for	 clarifying	 confusion	 as	well	 as	 disagreement	 at	 areas	of	 cross-cultural	
contact,	but	the	field	may	be	hindered	in	this	effort	so	 long	as	 it	employs	
models	 of	 religiosity	 that	 have	 been	 derived	 from	 philosophical	 debates	




upbringing	 and	 education,	 shape	 views	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 religion.	 I	 show	 that	
philosophers	of	religion	are	 indeed	 influenced	by	such	factors,	and	that	these	have	an	
impact	on	 their	philosophical	work.	The	answer	 to	 the	empirical	question	 is	 therefore	
yes,	 philosophers	 of	 religion	 are	 influenced	 by	 IFs	 in	 forming	 their	 philosophical	
attitudes.	 For	 instance,	43.9%	of	 respondents	explicitly	 gave	 their	 religious	upbringing	
and/or	identity	as	a	motivation	for	engaging	in	philosophy	of	religion.	Also,	only	11.5%	
of	participants	 said	 there	was	no	 relationship	between	 their	 personal	 religious	beliefs	




In	 the	 sample,	 significantly	more	 atheists	 who	 engage	 in	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 were	
former	 theists	 than	 the	 reverse.	 This	 asymmetry	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	
philosophy	of	religion	attracts	people	who	find	religion	important,	and	such	people	are	
more	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 religious	 background	 or	 upbringing.	 The	 theme	 of	 faith	 seeking	
understanding	 that	emerged	 in	 this	 survey	 supports	 this	hypothesis.	 Those	who	come	




Nicene	 Creed,	 demonstrates	 that	 this	 group	 is	 highly	 represented	 in	 philosophy	 of	
religion,	 especially	 as	 compared	 to	 philosophy	 in	 general.	 The	 low	 representation	 of	
theists	outside	of	Christianity	(3.6%),	agnostics	(5.8%),	and	the	relatively	small	number	
of	 respondents	 who	 fall	 outside	 of	 the	 classical	 theism,	 atheism,	 or	 agnostic	 divide	
(10.8%),	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 published	 work	 in	 philosophy	 of	 religion,	 which	 is	 mostly	
concerned	with	Christian	theism,	generic	theism,	or	atheism.		
The	view	that	philosophy	of	religion	is	primarily	a	form	of	apologetics—voiced	by	some	
participants	 in	 the	 survey—is	 not	 confirmed	 in	 this	 study,	 since	 only	 7.2%	 of	
respondents	 (12.5%	 of	 Christians	 in	 the	 sample)	 provide	 proselytism,	 witness,	 or	
apologetics	 as	 a	 reason	 to	 engage	 in	 philosophy	 of	 religion.	 Some	 of	 the	 reasons	
philosophers	of	religion	chose	to	specialize	in	this	discipline	are	probably	similar	to	the	
reasons	other	philosophers	have	for	their	specializations:	33.1%	expressed	an	interest	in	









are	benign,	 and	acknowledge	 that	 in	 some	cases	we	do	need	 to	 revise	our	beliefs,	or	
lower	our	confidence	that	p	when	we	become	aware	that	it	was	formed	as	a	result	of	an	
IF.	By	contrast,	proponents	of	uniqueness	 (e.g.,	White	2014)	 think	 that	 IFs	are	akin	 to	
ingesting	a	pill	 that	causes	one	 to	 form	a	belief	at	 random.	Unfortunately,	 there	 is	no	
	 30	
generally-agreed	 principled	 account	 of	 which	 IFs	 are	 innocuous	 and	 which	 are	
pernicious.	 Schoenfield	 (2014)	 recommends	 to	 look	at	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	beliefs	
formed	 through	 IFs	 are	 in	 tension	 with	 one’s	 other	 beliefs.	 According	 to	 her,	 beliefs	
formed	early	in	life	(for	instance,	through	upbringing)	are	less	likely	to	be	in	tension	with	
one’s	 other	 beliefs,	 and	 thus	 we	 are	 permitted	 to	 maintain	 such	 beliefs.	 One	
unfortunate	consequence	of	this	view	is	that	one	can	hold	patently	false	and	irrational	
beliefs,	as	 long	as	 they	 form	a	coherent	belief	 system	and	were	acquired	early	 in	 life,	
e.g.,	someone	who	was	raised	with	scientologist	or	young	earth	creationist	views	could	
maintain	them	rationally,	as	long	as	she	refuses	to	incorporate	scientific	views	in	tension	
with	 her	 prior	 beliefs.	 This	makes	 the	 rationality	 of	 beliefs	 overtly	 dependent	 on	 the	
chronological	 order	 in	 which	 they	 are	 acquired.	 Kelly	 (2014)	 holds	 a	 more	 stringent	
position,	 arguing	 that	 rational	 responses	 are	 situated	 within	 a	 certain	 range.	 For	
instance,	 it	would	be	 irrational	 to	deny	anthropogenic	 causes	of	 climate	change	given	
the	evidence,	but	there	is	still	a	range	of	rational	responses	about	the	severity	of	effects	
of	climate	change,	such	as	the	projected	rise	in	sea	levels.	One	problem	with	the	range	
view5	is	 that	 it	does	not	make	any	claims	about	which	 IFs	 should	worry	us,	but	 rather	
concentrates	on	the	responses	that	are	reasonable	in	the	light	of	IFs.	For	instance,	one	
could	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 clearly	 bad	 IF,	 such	 as	White’s	 (2014)	 hypothetical	 pill-popping	
cases,	which	would	 still	 be	 fine	 if	 the	 resulting	 belief	 fell	within	 an	 acceptable	 range.	
Vavova	(2018,	145)	proposes	that	we	only	have	to	revise	our	belief	that	p	when	we	have	
independent	 reasons	 to	 assume	 that	 IFs	 make	 our	 belief	 that	 p	 unreliable.	 She	
formulates	the	Good	Independent	Reason	Principle	 (GIRP).	 If	 recognizing	such	 IFs	gives	
you	 “good	 independent	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 you	 are	mistaken	with	 respect	 to	p,	 you	
must	 revise	 your	 confidence	 in	 p	 accordingly—insofar	 as	 you	 can.”	 Given	 that	 this	
heuristic	still	allows	quite	a	lot	of	latitude,	and	since	IFs	are	pervasive	in	the	formation	of	





We	have	so	 far	 seen	 that	 the	answer	 to	 the	empirical	question	 is	an	unequivocal	yes.	
Should	 this	 influence	 of	 IFs	 on	 the	 work	 of	 philosophers	 of	 religion	 be	 a	 cause	 for	
concern?	From	 the	armchair,	 some	authors	have	argued	 that	philosophy	of	 religion	 is	
subject	to	IFs	that	are	harmful	for	the	discipline.	Here	follow	their	main	objections:		
Self-selection:	 IFs,	 such	 as	 Christian	 upbringing	 or	 personal	 religious	 identity,	 have	
motivated	 a	 majority	 of	 philosophers	 of	 religion	 to	 specialize	 in	 it.	 There	 is	 thus	 an	
unhealthy	self-selection	going	on	in	philosophy	of	religion	(Draper	&	Nichols,	2013).		





as	 the	 default	 options,	 thus	 ruling	 out	 a	 variety	 of	 other	 potentially	 philosophically	
viable	beliefs	(Schellenberg	2015,	Schilbrack	2014).		
Considering	self-selection	first,	as	we	have	seen,	the	majority	of	respondents	admit	they	







upon	 reading	 this	 study	 realizes	 he	 is	 also	 one	 of	 these	 Christians	 who	 became	
interested	in	the	subject	because	of	his	religious	upbringing.	This	fact,	by	itself,	does	not	
give	him	 independent	reasons	to	 think	his	philosophical	views	are	unreliable,	unless	 it	







Prejudice	 is	 a	more	 serious	 charge,	 hinting	 at	 an	 unhealthy	 conflict	 of	 interest	where	
philosophers	 of	 religion,	 whether	 atheist,	 theist,	 or	 otherwise	 inclined,	 are	 merely	
arguing	 for	and	confirming	what	 they	already	believe.	Confirmation	bias,	which	 lies	at	
the	basis	of	prejudice,	is	a	prevalent	phenomenon	(Nickerson,	1998).	When	a	subject	S	is	
already	convinced	that	p,	S	will	typically	evaluate	evidence	and	arguments	in	favor	of	p	
as	 stronger	 than	 arguments	 against	 p.	 She	 is	 disposed	 to	 devote	 resources	 to	 find	











of	 religion.	 The	evidence	presented	here	 suggests	 that	 little	or	no	 change	 is	 relatively	




more	 complex	 change	 in	 their	 views	 as	 a	 result	 of	 engagement	 with	 philosophy	 of																																																									
6	Thank	you	to	David	Christensen	for	alerting	me	to	this	possibility.		
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religion.	 Given	 that	 lack	 of	 change	 was	 rare	 (18%	 saw	 little	 or	 no	 change	 in	 their	
outlooks),	 prejudice	 is	 less	 of	 a	 problem	 in	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 than	 is	 commonly	
thought.		
Constraint	looks	at	the	range	of	positions	philosophers	of	religion	typically	defend,	and	
states	 that	 they	 have	 been	 unduly	 constrained	 in	 their	 consideration	 of	 alternative	
positions	 (e.g.,	 polytheism,	 Taoism)	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 cultural	 background.	 There	 is	
relatively	little	work	in	non-Christian	theist	philosophy	which	may	be	due	to	the	fact	that	
very	few	philosophers	of	religion	are,	for	instance,	Buddhist	or	neo-Pagan.	With	a	mainly	
western	Christian	or	post-Christian	background,	philosophers	of	 religion	 tend	 to	 see	a	
generic	 form	 of	 theism,	 Christian	 theism	 (exploring	 concepts	 like	 the	 Trinity	 or	 the	
Incarnation),	and	scientific	naturalism	as	the	default	options.	Thick	non-Christian	beliefs,	
such	as	Mormon	eternal	progression	or	Jain	jiva	(the	essence	of	a	living	being	that	gets	
reincarnated	 through	 different	 life	 forms),	 are	 ignored.	 Yet	 they	 seem	 as	 worthy	 of	
philosophical	exploration	as	thick	Christian	views,	which	have	received	ample	attention	
in	 the	 philosophical	 literature	 (see	 e.g.,	 the	 cottage	 industry	 on	 the	 Latin	 and	 social	
Trinity	that	has	sprung	up	in	recent	years).		
Does	 the	 realization	 that	 philosophers	 of	 religion	 have	 left	many	 options	 unexplored	
provide	 them	 with	 a	 reason	 for	 skepticism	 about	 their	 current	 philosophical	 beliefs?	
Although	constraint	looks	superficially	similar	to	self-selection,	it	has	considerably	more	
skeptical	force.	For	self-selection,	a	philosopher	of	religion	is	asked	to	consider	whether	
her	 motivations	 might	 give	 her	 any	 reasons	 for	 doubting	 the	 beliefs	 she	 holds.	 For	
constraint,	 she	 has	 to	 consider	 that	 a	 vast	 conceptual	 space	 of	 religious	 views	 is	 left	
philosophically	unexplored	because	of	haphazard	factors	in	the	upbringing	and	religious	
backgrounds	of	philosophers	of	religion.	The	realization	that	 IFs	constrain	the	range	of	
viable	 options	 does	 provide	 a	 reason	 to	 reconsider	 one’s	 confidence	 in	 one’s	






one	 of	 them.	 But	 then	 you	 notice	 that	 some	pages	were	 torn	 out	 of	 the	 book.	Upon	
browsing	an	undamaged	copy,	it	turns	out	that	instead	of	only	three	answers,	there	are	
30	 possible	 answers.	 It	 seems	 rational	 to	 reduce	 your	 confidence	 in	 the	 position	 you	
have	argued	for,	even	though	you	were	even-handed	in	your	(limited)	choice.	Without	
considering	 the	 other	 solutions,	 your	 confidence	 seems	 misguided.	 Likewise,	 if	 a	
philosopher	 of	 religion	 comes	 to	 a	 carefully	 argued	 scientific	 naturalism,	 thin	
monotheism,	 or	 Christian	 theism,	 her	 confidence	 should	be	 shaken	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	
role	 of	 IFs	 in	 leading	her	 and	other	 philosophers	 of	 religion	 to	 consider	 only	 these	 as	













For	 the	 epistemological	 question	 of	 whether	 these	 factors	 negatively	 influence	




IFs	 make	 our	 beliefs	 unreliable,	 we	 should	 re-evaluate	 these	 beliefs.	 I	 have	 outlined	
three	 worries	 for	 philosophers	 of	 religion:	 the	 role	 of	 self-selection,	 prejudice,	 and	
constraint	 in	 the	 cultural	 backgrounds	 of	 its	 practitioners.	 Although	 self-selection	 and	
prejudice	 are	 frequently	 flagged	 as	 problems	 for	 philosophy	 of	 religion,	 they	 do	 not	
require	revision	of	opinions.	I	have	shown	that	constraint	plays	a	negative	epistemic	role	
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